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RECENT DECISIONS
Sales: Rights of buyer's judgment creditors under a fraudulent
bulk sale-An Illinois Corporation, Central Metallic Casket Co.,
physically transferred its assets to Wisconsin between May 20th and
June 1st of 1955. The directors of the Wisconsin Corporation, who
were the same as those of the Illinois Corporation, assumed all the
debts and obligations of the Illinois Corporation. There was no com-
pliance with the Bulk Sales Act of Illinois. The Wisconsin Corpora-
tion was forced into bankruptcy on April 3, 1956, following a petition
filed against it by creditors of the Illinois Corporation. Plaintiffs, the
creditors of the Illinois Corporation, claimed that the transfer to the
Wisconsin Corporation was "void" as to them under the Bulk Sales
Act. Therefore, the Wisconsin Corporation as transferee obtained no
title to the property, and the trustee could obtain no lien against the
property to which the bankrupt had no title.
The referee concluded that Illinois law governed, and that the Bulk
Sales Act was not complied with. But this noncompliance made the
transfer "voidable" rather than "void," and as the plaintiffs filed their
claims against the Wisconsin Corporation, they waived their rights
under the Bulk Sales Act, and are now estopped to assert a lien on
the goods in the hands of the trustee, who is a hypothetical lien holder.
The District Court affirmed the referee.1 It held that creditors of
the fraudulent transferor do not have a lien, but a mere "inchoate
right until asserted and ripened by appropriate judicial proceedings."12
The Court then held that innocent creditors of a fraudulent grantee3
who have levied on property before any action is taken by the creditors
of the fraudulent grantor, have a superior right over the latter.
Even though the Bulk Sales Act uses the word "void" instead of
"voidable," the Court following serevad New York decisions, held
"void" in fraudulent conveyance statutes to mean "voidable," as any
different holding would cause "a material variation in the rights of
bona fide purchasers from a fraudulent grantee, under the Fraudulent
Conveyance Act." Therefore, as the transfer was voidable, the plain-
tiff's rights were cut off by the rights of the trustee in bankruptcy
as attaching lienholder.5
I In Re Central Metallic Casket Co., 170 F. Supp. 320 (E. D. Wis. 1959).
2 Id. at 324.
3 Under Section 70 (c) of the Bankruptcy Act, Title 11 U.S.C.A. §110 (c)(1952), the trustee has the status of an attaching creditor without notice
of an unrecorded prior lien.
4 In Re Central Metallic Casket Co., supra note 1, at 326.
5 The United States Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the District
Court, did not deal with the issue presented in this article. The Court held
that the physical transfer of the assets to Wisconsin was not the sale itself;
the sale took place when the Wisconsin Corporation was formed, and there-
fore since this was a Wisconsin sale, the Wisconsin Bulk Sales Act should be
applied. Under Wisconsin law, the Bulk Sales Act applies only to transfers
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The rule layed down in the principal case is the rule applied gen-
erally to fraudulent conveyances., This rule was first enunciated in
In Re Mullen7 and a simple statement of the rule is found in Brill v.
Forshay:
Innocent creditors of a fraudulent grantee, who have acquired
a lien and levied on property before any steps have been taken
by the creditors of the fraudulent grantor will hold the property
as against such other creditors though not as against prior lien
creditors."
The reasoning upon which this rule was based is that, as between
the creditors of the fraudulent grantor and the innocent creditors of
the grantee, the equities with resepect to the fraudulently conveyed
property are equal; therefore, the first to perfect his lien should take
precedence. Of course, where the creditors of the grantee had knowl-
edge of the fraud, actual or constructive, they could not recover."
Also, some distinction appears to be made on whether or not the
creditor had given fresh consideration in reliance on the grantee's
apparent ownership of the property or is merely endeavoring to subject
the property to a debt against him antedating the conveyance or other-
wise not incurred in reliance on the apparent ownership of the prop-
erty.10 However, with these exceptions, the majority opinion seems to
follow the rule stated above. 1
The first application of the general rule of fraudulent conveyances
to bulk sales transactions is found in City of New York v. Johnson, 2
upon which the District Court in the principal case relied so heavily.
This case specifically applied the fraudulent conveyance doctrine to the
grantee's attaching creditors under the Bulk Sales Act, in holding:
We are referred to no authority and can see no reason for hold-
ing that the word "void" means more than "voidable" where the
of property held for sale at retail, and therefore the case could easily be dis-
posed of. In Re Central Metallic Casket Co., 273 F. 2d 506 (7th Cir. 1960).
G In Re Central Metallic Casket Co., supra note 1, at 324.
7In Re Mullen, 101 Fed. 413, 416, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1900).
8Brill v. Forshay, 65 F. 2d 420 (8th Cir. 1933).
9 Wilkinson v. Livingston, 45 F. 2d 465 (8th Cir. 1930) ; Goldberg, B. and Co.
v. Demick, 77 Cal. App. 535, 247 Pac. 261 (1926); Powell v. Ivey, 88 N.C.
256 (1883).
30 Applegate v. Applegate, 107 Iowa 312, 78 N.V. 34 (1899) ; Hull v. Angster,
107 N.J. 454, 153 Atl. 93 (1931); Lowenthal v. Standard Oil Co., 114 N.J.
375, 168 Atl. 857 (1933). But see Manhattan Co. v. Evertson, 6 Paige (N.Y.)
457 (1837)) for case upholding grantee's creditor even though the claim
against the property was based on an antecedent debt.
"1 148 A.L.R. 521 (1944). For cases following majority rule, see: In Re Mullen,
supra note 7, at 413; Brill v. Forshay, supra note 8, at 420; Standard National
Bank v. Garfield National Bank, 67 N.Y.S. 472, 56 App. Div. 43 (1900) ; Booth
v. Bunce, 24 N.Y. 592 (1862); Parker v. Freeman, 2 Tenn. Ch. 612 (1876).
However, for cases contra the majority rule, see: Westervelt v. Hagge, 61
Neb. 647, 85 N.W. 852 (1901); Manhattan Co. v. Evertson, supra note 10,
at 457.
12 City of New York v. Johnson, 137 F. 2d 163 (2d Cir. 1943).
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remedies given by the Act are invoked, or that the consequences
to a bona fide purchaser from a fraudulent grantee are materi-
ally different under the Bulk Sales Act from such consequences
under the Fraudulent Conveyance Act."
This language was relied on by a subsequent New York case,14 and
the principal case' 5 in coming to their conclusion. The reason given in
the Johnson case for applying the "fraudulent conveyance" rule to
bulk sales transactions, as shown above, was that no "authority" or
"reason" could be given for holding otherwise.
It appears to this writer, however, that there is both "authority"
and "reason" for holding otherwise. In an early Texas case, Midland
Shoe Co. v. A. L. and K. Dry Goods Case.," the plaintiffs were credit-
ors of the fraudulent grantee, who sold stock in trade in violation of
the Bulk Sales Act, and the defendants were judgment creditors of the
grantee. The court held that "the statute expressly provides that a
bulk sale shall be 'void' as to creditors unless its provisions are com-
plied with."' 7 It was said that there can be no bona fide purchasers
because the original transaction was void. Several other cases, decided
before New York v. Johnson, agree with the Midland Shoe- Co. case.'"
One of these,' 9 in holding that a sale to a subsequent vendee was in-
valid as against attaching creditors of the bulk seller, stated, "The
general policy and purpose of the Act [Bulk Sales Act], is to render
the alleged sale null and void ab initio as against creditors of the
seller." 20 Thus it can be seen that there was no lack of authority as
stated in the Johnson case.
The Johnson case, and the cases which relied on it, held that a
trustee in bankruptcy not only had the rights of an attaching creditor,
but also that an attaching creditor had the rights of a "bona fide pur-
chaser for value.'21 It has long been established that, even under the
Bulk Sales Act, a "bona fide purchaser for value" takes as against
creditors of the fraudulent grantor.22 But the problem is that most
3 Id. at 166, 167.
14In Re Vanity Fair Shoe Co., 84 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), affirmed,
Schwartz v. A. J. Armstrong Co., Inc., 179 F. 2d 766 (2d Cir. 1950).
15 The identical language was used in In Re Central Metallic Casket Co., supra
note 1, at 325-326.
16 Midland Shoe Co. v. A. L. and K. Dry Goods Co., 281, S.W. 344 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1926).
:7 Id at 345.
'sKett v. Masker, 86 N.J.L. 97, 90 Atl. 243 (1914) ; Sampsell v. Imperial Paper
Co., 313 U.S. 215, (1941); Owosso Carriage and Sleigh Co. v. McIntosh &
Warren, 107 Tex. 307, 179 S.W. 257 (1915).
19 Kett v. Masker, supra note 18, at 245.
20 Id. at 246.
21 City of N.Y. v. Johnson, supra note 12, at 165. The Court did not hold a trustee
in bankruptcy had the rights of a bona fide purchaser, but held a judgment
creditor did.
22 Prokopovitz v. Kurkowski, 170 Wis. 190, 174 N.W. 448 (1919) ; McKelvey v.
Schapp, etc. Drug Co., 143 Ark. 477, 220 S.W. 827 (1920); Grove Mfg. Co.
v. Salter, 26 Ga. App. 369. 106 S.E. 208 (1921) ; Kelley Buckley Co. v. Cohen,
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courts hold that judgment creditors do not have the rights of "bona
fide purchasers for value."
23
At the present time, there appears to be a lack of agreement as to
the legal status of bulk transfers made without compliance with statu-
tory provisions.24 The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act nowhere
contains the word "void,' 25 and therefore the transfer of the construc-
tion of this statute to bulk sales legislation is certainly not obvious.
Even if the "fraudulent conveyance" rule were applied, not all of the
transferor's judgment creditors would be protected. 26 And, as the trend
of cases has been generally, to liberally construe bulk sales acts to
protect creditors of the seller from illegal transfers,27 it would also
seem logical for the courts to construe the meaning of the Acts in
this situation in favor of the transferor's creditor's.
The language and purpose of the Bulk Sales Act seem to be the
persuasive factors in arguing that the general rule of fraudulent con-
veyances does not apply. The purpose of the Act is to protect the
rights of creditors of vendors of property in the sale and transfer of
personal property.28 And it is certainly a possibility that by using the
word "void," the lawmakers meant just that and not "voidable."
It seems to this author, that if the purpose of the Bulk Sales Act
is to be carried out, the defrauded creditors of the seller should be
given the fullest possible protection. This purpose, plus the strict
wording of the Act itself, seems to require that innocent creditors of
the bulk seller take precedence over innocent creditors of the bulk
buyer, at least where the latter creditors did not give up fresh con-
sideration in reliance on the apparent ownership of the property.
The Uniform Commercial Code deals more explicitly with the issue.
Section 6-104 (1) states that ". . . a bulk transfer is ineffective against
any creditor of the transferor unless . . .-29 certain requirements are
complied with. The word "ineffective," in itself, seems more ambiguous
than the term "void" as used in most Bulk Sales Acts. However, two
other sections seem to solve the problem. Section 6-111 requires action
by the transferor's creditors within six months of the transfer unless
there has been concealment,"0 and Section 6-110 (2) allows a good
195 Mass. 585, 81 N.E. 297 (1907); Markarian v. Whitmarsh, 78 N.H. 1, 95
Atl. 788 (1915) ; WILLISTON, SALES, §643, at 1117 (1924).
23 148 A.L.R. 533-535 (1944). Couse v. Columbia Powder M'fg. Co., 33 Atl.
297 (N.J.Eq. 1895) ; Richardson v. Gerle 54 Atl. 438 (N.J. Eq. 1903) ; In Re
Mullen, supra note 7, at 417.
24 65 HARV. L. REV. 418, at 432 (1952).
25 UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, Wis. Stat. Ch. 242 (1959).
26 See footnote 10.
'728 TEXAS L. REV. 989, at 991 (1959).
28 Hanson v. Knutson, 182 Wis. 459, 196 N.W. 831 (1924).
29 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, §6-104 (1).
30 UNIFORM COM ERCIAL CODE, §6-111.
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faith purchaser for value to take free of the defect.31 The broad defini-
tion given to "purchasers" would probably include any type of credit-
ors.32 Therefore, under the Uniform Commercial Code, the principal
case would probably have been decided the same way.
IRviN J. FRIEDLAND
Sales: Liability of a manufacturer of ingredient to another food
processor based on breach of warranty of fitness for human con-
sumption-Plaintiff biscuit company used snow ice to reduce the
temperature of the dough in its preparation of frozen biscuits to be
sold to the public. Shipments of ice were delivered each day by a
distributor, Crossland Ice Service, from defendant ice company. The
defendant placed the shipping tags on the bags of ice and knew the
destination and that the ice would be used by the biscuit company for
preparing food for human consumption. Glass was discovered in sev-
eral of the bags of ice after some frozen biscuits had already been
prepared with part of the ice shipment. Plaintiff destroyed all dough
that had been prepared with that shipment of ice and, being uncertain
as to which day's shipment of ice contained the glass, recalled and
destroyed those biscuits already distributed that may have been con-
taminated by the glass.
At the trial in district court' the jury made several findings: that
the ice contained glass when sold and delivered; that the defendant
knew it was to be used in the preparation of food for human con-
sumption; and that the plaintiff had been injured as a result of the
contamination of the ice with glass. The jury determined damages
using as a basis the cost of biscuit materials destroyed, and the cost
of distribution and recall of the biscuits. Nevertheless, the court denied
recovery n.o.v. holding that the remedy for breach of implied war-
ranty of fitness for human consumption was available only to a con-
sumer.
Held, reversed on appeal.2 It was determined that a food processor
who discovers that his product has been adulterated by a deleterious
substance in one of the ingredients supplied by another manufacturer
may recover from that manufacturer (although there is no privity or
allegation of negligence) on the ground that there has been a breach
of warranty of fitness for human consumption.
The court found that the ice, if not a food in the nutritive sense,
32 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, §1-201 (33), and §1-201 (34).31 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, §6-110 (2).
' Gladiola Biscuit Company v. Southern Ice Company, 163 F. Supp. 570 (E.D.
Tex. 1958).
2 Gladiola Biscuit Company v. Southern Ice Company, 267 F. 2d 138 (5th Cir.
1959).
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